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''I Will Never Forget the Sound
of Those Engines Going Avvay''
A Re-exainination into the Sinking of
HMCS Athabaskan, 29 April 1944
Peter A. Dixon
n the morning of 29 April 1944 the Canadian
Tribal Class Destroyer HMCS Athabaskan
was sunk in the English Channel after an
engagement with the German Elbing Class
Destroyers T-24 and T-27. The official
explanation from the "inquiry into the Loss of
HMCS Alhabaskan" claimed that Athabaskan
sank because of two explosions, the first at 0417
hours, and the second at 0427 hours. 1 The first
explosion was attributed to a torpedo from T-24. 2
The second explosion was believed to have
occurred when fuel fires, caused by the first
explosion. ignited the 4-inch magazine>)

O

While this may seem simple and complete,
an examination of the source material reveals that
there is much confusion as to the actual chain of
events. This confusion is focused on the cause of
the second explosion. Eyewitness accounts have
Athabaslcan being torpedoed twice on the port
side. This explanation seems to have been
discounted by the Board. Then there are
Athabaslcan and Haida ·s reports of "three
echoes" being seen on the radar and Commander
DeWolfs assertion that GermanE-boats were
involved. This assertion became the basis for Len
Burrow and Emile Beaudoin's book Unlucky

answers. TheE-boat mystery has been put to rest
by Michael Whitby, in his article "'Fooling Around
The French Coast': RCN Tribal Class Destroyers
in Action, April 1944." He cites the German record
of the action and states that the only German
vessels involved were T-24 and T-27. This has
resulted in the British inquiry being deemed
officially correct, with credit for the sinking being
attributed to T-24. Yet this confusion is
compounded by the statement in the inquiry's
report that the members of the board: "did not
consider [whether] any other ships were present. "4
This is a curious statement. It is quite likely that
another ship was indeed present. Unfortunately,
it may have been the British Motor Torpedo Boat
(MTB) 677 (commanded by Lieutenant A.
Clayton, RNVR). 5
All reconstructions of the action on 29 April
1944 have centred on the movements of Haida
and Athabaskan beginning at 0400 hours. Yet
the actions of all of the other participants must
be reviewed to fully understand the situation. The
movements of the other forces have, to date, been
ignored. When the positions of the Tribals, the
minelayers and the MTB's are plotted together,
the inferences become astounding.

Lady: The Ltfe and Death qf HMCS Athabaskan.

Yet this book raises more questions than it

Opposite - Top: HMCS Athabaskan. Plymouth.
England. March 1944.
(NAC PA 115356)
Bottom: Ship's Company. HMCS Athabaskan,
Devonporl.. England. September 1 943.
(NAC PA 131800)

It was a very tense time for the Plymouth
Command. Men and material were pouring into
British ports for the upcoming invasion. German
destroyers and E-boats still posed a threat to this
activity. During the morning of 26 April, Force
26, consisting of the British cruiser HMS Black
Prince, and the destroyers HMS Tartar, HMS
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HMCS Athabaskan rei urns to Plymouth after the night action of 25 I 26 April 1944.
(Photo courtesy

Ashan.ti, with the Canadian Tribals HMCS
Athabaskan. HMCS Haida. and HMCS Huron.
engaged the German Elbing class destroyers T-29,
T-27, T-24. T-29 was sunk by Haida and Huron.
while T-27 and T-24 escaped with damage. This

engagement was regarded as "very successful" 6
and served to affirm the tactics of the 1Oth
Destroyer Flotilla. The unfortunate consequence
for Athabaskan was that during this action HMS
Tartar sustained damage, while HMS Ashanti and
HMCS Huron were involved in a minor collision
that put them out of action, requiring drydocking.
Haida and Athabaskan remained the only ships
available for operations.
Success was short lived as disaster struck
the Allied forces on the night of April 27. Nine

of author)

German E-boats from the 9th Torpedo Flotilla
attacked a convoy off Lyme Bay sinking LST 507
and LST 537 and torpedoing LST 289 with a loss
of 197 sailors and 441 soldiers. 7 The fact that
the destroyer force sent to intercept them missed
and allowed them to escape unscathed must have
been bitter to Plymouth Command.
"Operation Hostile XXVI" was scheduled for
the night of 28-29 April. Hostile Operations were
British minelaying missions as part of Operation
Neptune and the Normandy invasion. Hostile
XXVI was to be conducted by the 1Oth Minelaying
Flotilla consisting of eight minelayers which were
to be screened by MTB 677 (Senior Officer) and
MTB 717 of the 52 MTB Flotilla.;; Haida and
Athabaskan were to be the "Support Force.""

18
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This aspect of the engagement has until now
been totally ignored by histortans. Yet the position
of the minefield and its proximity to the
subsequent destroyer engagement is crucial to
understand events. (See Plot 1)

"unidentified vessel 205o Start Point 6'"~ at 0136
hours. Nine minutes later C-in-C Plymouth
signalled "course estimated west speed 20 knots."
1

Plymouth plotted the developing situation and
~----=-----------;::;-.:-:-:-;;;;~~~;===;=----==::::==;--) at 030 7 hours signalled "Support
Force to Steer SW at Full Speed for
20 miles. " 12 This message was
49.10
received in Haida's plot at 0322
hours. Haida altered course to 225
and went to 28 knots. I:J At 0332
hours course was altered to 205 then
at 0343 hours course was altered to
180. Commander De Wolfs intention
was
to "prevent the enemy from
:55
getting past to the westward." ~ By
intercepting them offile de Vierge, the
Trtbals had a good chance of engaging
the Germans before daylight.
1

At 0359 hours Athabaskan
obtained a radar contact bearing 133
degrees at 14 miles. This was
confirmed by Haida at 0402 hours.
Course was altered to the east to
close. Haida's "Plot" established that
the Germans were steering 280
PlOT #1
degrees at 24 knots. At 0411 hours
This plot is in 2:1 scale. Each circle equals two nautical miles.
Athabaskan reported "3 echoes"
The distance from point BB to the Radar Contact is twenty-one nautical miles.
which Haida's 271 Q radar confirmed
with the third echo being smaller. 15
Commander DeWolf gave the order to engage the
The minefield was an eight-mile pentagon with
enemy at 0412 hours and both Haida and
point BB being 16.7 miles northeast of Ile de Bas.
Athabaskan opened fire with star shell at a range
Haida and Athabaskan were to the west of this
of 7,300 yards. Two minutes later Commander
point. patrolling a box from 49 10'N to 49 5'N
DeWolf signalled Plymouth "2 Enemy Destroyers
and from 04 'W to 4 l O'W. This deployment would
bearing 115 distance 4 miles course 260 speed
allow the two Tribals to intercept any threat
unknown bearing 014 Ile de Vierge 6 miles." 1n
heading north. The minelaying was to be
completed by 0330 hours and Haida and
When they were illuminated by the star shells,
Athabaskan were to return to Plymouth at 0345
the two German destroyers were completely taken
hours at 20 knots. They were not expected to meet
by surprise. They reacted quickly, however, and
the enemy. The two Tribals arrived at their patrol
began to tum away to the South, in keeping with
position at 0200 hours. went to "Action Stations"
their instructions. The German tactics were to
and began "snaking" the patrol line at 16 knots. 10
turn and fire torpedoes upon being engaged,
which they did. T-27 fired six torpedoes on the
Meanwhile, the German Destroyers T-24 and
wrong beartng, actually at T-24, which had to take
T-27 had left St. Malo and were attempting to
evasive action. 17 T-24 's after torpedoes were fired
reach Brest to effect repairs from the action of26
on the wrong bearing. The three from the forward
April. They were skirting the coast as T-27s speed
mounting were fired on the correct bearing. 18 (See
was down io 24 knots. The commander ofT-27
Plot 2).
had issued instructions to "head for the coast and
avoid combat" if the enemy were encountered..
At 041 7 hours Commander De Wolf ordered
They were detected by radar in Plymouth, and
a
30
degree turn to port to avoid the expected
Commander-in-Chief Plymouth sent the signal
19
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MANEUVERING BOARD

Even while Haida was maneuvering to lay smoke, her guns kept
firing, scoring their first hit on T-24
at 0418 hours, and another at 0420
hours. At 0422 hours T-27 was
observed broad on Haida's
starboard bow and fire was shifted
to her. T-24 disappeared into smoke
to the east. Haida altered course to
keep T-24 ahead and T-27 on the
starboard bow. Haida's gunnery was
superb as hit after hit was observed.
T-27 attempted to head inshore to
evade. Hit repeatedly by Haida. a
large fire broke out behind her
forward gun making it difficult for her
Captain to conn the ship. Blinded and
ablaze, T-27 ran hard ashore. The
crew abandoned ship while still being
hit by Haida's salvoes. 21

Stopped and on fire. Athabaskan
had only minutes to live. The torpedo
This plot is in 1:2 scale. Each circle equals five hundred yards.
from T-24 had crippled her. but the
damage was not fatal. She began to
torpedo tracks. Haida did so. Athabaskan was
settle by the stern and preparations
400 yards astern. As they commenced the turn,
were made to rig for tow by Haida. The 70-ton
torpedo number three from the forward mounting
pump was being maneuvered aft to control the
flooding. As the flooding increased, Athabaskan 's
of T-24 struck Athabaskan at an oblique angle
Captain, Lieutenant Commander John Stubbs,
on the port side in the 4-inch magazine and the
DSO, ordered "Stand by to Abandon Ship."
Wardroom. T-24's other two torpedoes missed
Athabaskan's Radar Officer. Lieutenant
astern.
Commander Dunn Lantier requested permission
Lieutenant R.B. Hayward, RCN, was
to clear "B" Gun of star shell. Permission was
Athabaskan's Navigating Officer during this
granted. After Athabaskan fired her last round.
action. In a report he wrote on 3 May 1945 he
"B" Gun was raked by small arms fire, killing
recalled that:
Able Seaman Hubert J. Peart. 22 Seconds later, at
the break of the foc'sle on the port side, a second
There were two definite explosions, one light,
torpedo struck. As the Canadian Naval Mission
one heavy. almost simultaneously. The explosion
Overseas
narrative states: "If there had been any
caused the propeller shafts to snap, the Porn
doubt
among
survivors as to the nature of the
Porn to be thrown into the air and the whole of
first hit there could be no difference of opinions
the after- superstructure to be set on fire. The
only survivor from "Y" gun reports the stern
in their minds that this was a torpedo. "2 :1
broke off between "Y" gun ammunition hoists
Lieutenant Hayward recalled:
PLOT #2

and the Wardroom hatch.' 9

This blast wrecked "X" gun (the twin 4-inch
mounting) and "Y" gun (the after 4.7-inch
mounting), killing most of the guns' crews.
Athabaskan sheered off to port and began to slow.
At 0417 hours Athabaskan signalled Haida "Hit
aft." At 0419 hours Haida altered course 90
degrees to port and began to lay a protective
smokescreen around Athabaskan. 20

The Captain said that he was going down to his
cabin for a moment. On his way back. he looked
into the Chart house where Paymaster
Lieutenant T.J. Brandson was putting C.B.'s
[Confidential Books] and charts into weighted
bags. Returning to the bridge on the port side.
he asked who was still on the bridge. Lieutenant
J.B. Scott replied that Lieutenant H.B. Hayward.
himself and Leading Signalman Thrasher. when
the torpedo struck the ship between Nos. l and

20
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2 Boiler Rooms on the port side. This caused a
terrific explosion throwing half of the boiler
rooms in to the air. A blanket of oil followed the
debris of red-hot shrapnel falling everywhere and
put out all the fires except for a small one on
the midship Oerlikon gun deck. The after half
of the ship sank immediately while the forward
half rolled slowly over to port and as soon as
the mast touched the water. the after end
commenced to sink. the bows lifted into the air
and she sank in a vertical position ... Almost all
those on the port side were instantly killed. while
those on the starboard side were badly burnt or
blown over the side. 2 '1

This then is the disputed second explosion.
Its effect was fatal. Athabaskan assumed a
"sprout. position"' and sank at 0427 hours. This
was sadly recorded in Haida ·s Ship's Log. 25
The source of this second torpedo is the
mystery. The official record is not clear as to
whether or not it. was from an E-boat, or from
one of the German destroyers. The War Diary of
the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla states that T-27 and
T-24 were the only German units in that area.
There were no E-boats operating that night.
Therefore. the second torpedo could not have
come from an E-boat.
Could the second torpedo have come from
one of the German destroyers? Twelve torpedoes
were fired at 0415 hours. Of those, nine were fired

on the wrong bearing, two missed astern, and the
last hit. At the time of the second torpedo hit,
T-27 was on fire and aground, and T-24 was eight
and a half miles to the east (and therefore five
and a half miles outside torpedo range).
However, the actions of MTB 677 and MTB
71 7 have not been considered. If they copied the
reports from C-in-C Plymouth they would have
been preparing for action. Knowing that there
were only the two Tribals, it would have been
tactically prudent to attempt an interception. 26
The minelayers completed their operation at 0315
hours, which would have put the MTBs at the
northwest corner of the minefield. 27 This area is
exactly 28 miles from the engagement area, which
is a 55 minute run at 30 knots. IfMTB 677 closed
on the engagement area at 0307 hours, it arrived
exactly on time to be picked up as the third radar
contact at 0411 hours. (See Plot 3).
The MTB would be steering between south
southwest and southwest anywhere from 260 to
245 degrees, the same relative direction the
Germans did. Athabaskan had this contact as
being off their port quarter, bearing 350 degrees
at a range of 3,000 to 4,000 yards. 2 e When the
gunfire commenced at 0411 hours, the MTB had
no way of knowing who was shooting at whom.
He either slowed, or swung north to get out of the
line of fire. The flash of T-24 's torpedo hitting

A British Motor Torpedo Boat at high speed.
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of the 28th).:11 As Haida could not be
seen that led the Germans into
thinking that they had been engaged
by much larger cruisers.:32 It also had
a tragic effect later when Haida
returned to the area to pick up
survivors. "Some thought at first it
was a German ship and were keeping
off. They did not know how the battle
had fared and feared Haida had been
sunk.":13
As MTB 677 approached the
sinkingAthabaskan, permission was

given to clear "B" Gun of star shell.
The flash of gun fire would have
appeared to have come from
nowhere, as well as expressing
hostile intent. MTB 677 would have
replied with machine gun fire down
the bearing of the flash. This resulted
in the raking of"B" Gun and the death
PLOT #3
of Able Seaman Peart. Athabaskan
This plot is in 1:1 scale. Each circle equals one thousand yards,
or one half of a nautical mile.
survivor George Parsons has
repeatedly stated that: "I saw the son
Athabaskan acted as a beacon and MTB 677
of a bitch go across the bow like a banshee. I saw
closed cautiously while attempting to identify the
the white track go into the port side."'\<! The
target.
resultant explosion ofthe boilers caused a "large
mushroom of white smoke" which was reported
Just what the MTB might have seen on its
as having been seen from 30 miles away.'15
arrival is but another tragic element in the history
of Athabaskan. The excellence of the Western
Haida signalled Plymouth at 0429 hours, "My
Approaches "Special Forces" Camouflage pattern
0414 one enemy on fire. "Athabaskan has blown
probably resulted in a misidentification. It is
up. "36 If MTB 677 copied this, they would have
ironic that this camouflage pattern was designed
instantly realized their mistake. Instead of staying
by a British MTB captain. 29 The blend of duck
and assisting, and not knowing Haida's position
egg blue, off-white and green was designed to
or intentions, it withdrew to the north at full
make the entire vessel blend into the horizon at
speed. Athabaskan survivor Able Seaman Ted
night. The MTB never saw Athabaskan's
Hewitt has stated, "I will never forget the sound
foredeck. As the "split foc'sle" pattern could not
of those engines going away ... ":l 7
be seen and the after end was completely ablaze,
identification as a Tribal Class destroyer was
Haida observed T-27 ablaze and aground at
impossible. Athabaskan would have looked
0435 hours. Commander DeWolf decided to retire
more like a "flush decked" Elbing.
as contact with T-24 had been lost at a range of
14,000 yards. Course was made to return to the
The effect of this camouflage can also be seen
area of Athabaskan's sinking. Haida signalled
by the German account of the action. When they
Plymouth that one destroyer had escaped
illuminated, "a number oftargets" were detected,
eastwards, and requested fighter cover for
none of which were positively identified as
daylight. At 0457 hours Haida stopped amid a
destroyers. 30 During the action, only Athabaskan
large number of survivors. '18 (If 677 retired at full
was targeted as the Germans could see her gun
speed it would be some 12 or 14 miles to the
flashes. (Haida was using flashless cordite having
north.) All concentration by the Haida's crew was
changed over from flash cordite on the morning
on saving their compatriots.

22

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1996

7

Canadian Military History, Vol. 5 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 3

Tension on Haida's bridge was enormous.
The gentle breeze was hampering rescue efforts
as the ship drifted from right to left. Those
survivors on Haida's starboard side had difficulty
trying to catch up. Commander DeWolf ordered
the serviceable motor boat and the whaler to be
lowered for the survivors. As well. eight carley
floats were dropped. The motor boat and whaler
were to be un-manned; at the last minute Leading
Seaman William McClure, Able Seaman Jack
Hannam, Stoker William Cummings manned the
boat. Cummings started the engine and the boat
began to pick up survivors.
At 0448 hours C-in-C Plymouth ordered the
Senior Officer of the 52nd MTB Flotilla to
"proceed immediately with MTB 717 to rescue
survivors of'Athabaskan' in approximate position
020 Ile de Vierge 8.'' Commander DeWolf decided
that Haida would remain for 15 minutes. The
rate of the drift was bringing the ship dangerously
close to a German mine field. :J!J This could be what
Lieutenant Commander Stubbs was trying to say
when he shouted "Get away Haida, get Clear." At
0515 hours Haida ·s engines went "Slow Ahead."
Reluctantly, course was shaped for Plymouth. At
0516 hours Haida went to 31 knots. 40 In alL
Haida rescued 42 Athabaskans. Haida signalled
C-in-C Plymouth. and to Senior Officer 52 MTB
Flotilla "Survivors of"Athabaskan" in position 020
Ile de Vierge 5.5" C-in-C Plymouth recalled the
MTBs to Plymouth at 053 7 hours as he believed
that the MTBs would not arrive on the scene until
an hour after daylight. 41 Thus, rescue by friendly
forces was denied.
What was Plymouth basing their assessment
on? If Hostile XXVI had gone according to plan,
all vessels would have left area BB at 0330 hours
at 20 knots. That would have put them near
Latitude 49 40 N some 50 miles north of the
location of the survivors. Therefore, it would have
taken two hours for them to reach the scene, well
after sunrise. If the MTBs had left the minelayers
and investigated the battle then they would be
one hour behind that estimated position and one
hour closer to the survivors. They would be
somewhere around Latitude 49 20 N. They would
also be one hour and a quarter ahead of Haida.
In his after action report Commander DeWolf
reported that on leaving the scene of the action
"IFF [Identification Friend or Foe] was reported
showing on the 242 scan of type 291 at 0530 for

about l minute, at ranges of 55000 yards 70000
yards and 65000 yards. These echoes only
showed on the scan when the starboard aerial
was switched in and it was assumed that the
transmissions were coming from either friendly
ships or aircraft on the starboard bow. " ~ Those
ranges of 35, 2T, and 32" miles off the
starboard bow would be consistent with the lead
of the minelayers. The range of 55,000 would be
exactly that of the MTB. There is no mention of
any aircraft being spotted or heard in Haida's
Ship's Log.
4

As Haida was racing north, rescue of the
Athabaskan survivors was continuing. T-24 had
been ordered to return to the area accompanied
by two minesweepers. They arrived at 0715 hours
and began to pick up survivors. Meanwhile,
Haida's motor cutter had picked up two of
Haida's crew who were swept off the scramble
nets when the ship went slow ahead at 0515
hours. The boat's crew also picked up six
Athabaskans and were attempting to take a
survivor-laden carley float in tow. One of the
German minesweepers left the others and began
to give chase to the motor cutter. The boat's cranky
engine was coaxed into life and the cutter
attempted to flee. Fortunately for the motor cutter,
the small boat had entered a German minefield
that caused the Minesweeper to abruptly turn
away and head back to the men in the water. In a
remarkable feat of navigating the motor cutter
made the hundred mile voyage across the English
Channel to Land's End. In all, 48 Aihabaskans
were rescued, six by the cutter and the rest by
Haida. A total of 85 sailors were rescued by the
Germans and became prisoners of war. One
hundred and twenty-eightAthabaskans died.
HMS Olfa and HMS Orwell were sent by Cin-C Plymouth to meet Haida and give her a safe
escort into Plymouth. Haidajoined with Ojfa at
0635 hours and with Orwell at 0650 hours and
proceeded to Eddystone. Haida secured
alongside at No.1 wharf at 0909 hours and landed
survivors at 0930 hours.
On 3 May 1944, four Royal Navy Captains
from Plymouth Command assembled to "Inquire
into the Loss of HMCS Athabaskan." The
principal document concerning events was
Commander DeWolfs "Report of Action," and a
copy of Haida's Track Chart. After some
discussion and consideration, the Board
23

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol5/iss1/3

8

Dixon: “I Will Never Forget the Sound of those Engines Going Away”: A Re

Right: The lucky
ones. Athabaskan
survivors in
England ]allowing
their rescue.
May 1944.
(NAC PA 131796)

Below: The notso-lucky. Sailors
are greeted by
Canadian Red
Cross girls in
London. England
_following their
release ]rom
German PoW
camps. May 1945.
(NAC PA 166523)

17. Since the Board of Inquiry sat. a
report has been received from the
Commanding O!Ticer ofMTB 677, who
was in command of Force "Hostile
XXVI. .. and was returning to England
from the vicinity of lle de Bas on the
early morning of 29th April. that he
saw two explosions. As he was at the
time a matter of about 30 miles to the
northeastward of Haida and
Athabaskan. he was not called as a
witness at the Board of Inquiry.
18. His description of t.l1e explosions
is. however. illuminating. He states in
his report (forwarded with Plymouth
letter No.1931 /Ply.l618 of 25th May.
1944 Report on ·'Hostile" Operation
XXIII, XXIV. XXV and XXVI) that at
0416 ··an explosion was sighted
followed by a burst of flame on a
bearing ofs.55o W. This was followed
at 0427 by a very large explosion with
a large mushroom of white smoke on
approximately the same bearing ...

This report is the proof that MTB 677
was at the scene of the engagement.

unanimously agreed that Athabaskan had been
sunk by enemy action. the specific cause being
either a torpedo or the explosion of the 4-inch
magazine.'1:1 This finding seemed to contradict
most of the survivors testimony as a message was
sent from the Canadian Naval Mission Overseas
to Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa on 30
April that stated: "Following information received
from survivors and boats crew Athabaskan hit
by first torpedo which blew off stern. Ship
remained afloat till hit by second torpedo. No
evidence of internal explosion. "44

First it was physically impossible for
Lieutenant Clayton to have seen
either of the explosions from 30 miles
away. as the "Distance to the Horizon"
from the bridge of an MTB at a height
of 10 to 12 feet off the water is
between 3.6 and 4.0 nautical miles.·' 6
Therefore in order for the explosion
to be seen at that distance, the height of the
explosion would have to have been over 525 feet
high. 47 Vice Admiral Leatham was of that view:"It
seems most improbable that hits by a 4-inch shell
could be discerned and described as an
"explosion" at 30 miles. It therefore seems most
probable that this explosion was caused by a
torpedo. "48 The second aspect to this is that he
has the exact times of both explosions. Had he
been with "Hostile X.XVI" (which was exactly 30
miles away) the time of the sighting would be later,
and not as precise as he claims.

The Commander-In-Chief Plymouth, Vice
Admiral Leatham wrote his report on the action
and the Board's findings on 1 June 1944.
Unfortunately, the copy in the Canadian records
has the first page missing. 45 He stated that he was
in general agreement with the Board of Inquiry.
Paragraphs 17 and 18 contain astounding
information:

The inclusion of Lieutenant Clayton's report
and the Board's dismissal ofthe third radar echo
with the statement that they "did not consider
that any other ships were present." can be
construed as an attempt to "close the book" on
the incident. This it has done. Nowhere in any of
the literature on this subject is there any mention
of the MTBs on April 28-29. From Peter Scott's

24
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Battle of the Narrow Seas: a History of Light
Coastal Forces, written in 1945, through Stephen
Roskill's War at Sea, to Correlli Barnett's Engage
the Enemy More Closely: the Royal Navy in the
Second World War, to Jurgen Rohwer and
Gerhard Hummelchen's Chronology of the War
at Sea, 1939-1945 all have Haida and
Athabaskan chancing into an engagement whilst

on patrol. Canadian writers have made mention
of a minelaying operation, but stop there while
concentrating on the engagement.
Vice Admiral Leatham's report legitimizing
Lieutenant Clayton's is the proof that "Operation
Hostile XXVI" took place. What happened during
it is the problem.
So ended the life of Canada's second Tribal
Class Destroyer. Athabaskan was indeed an
"Unlucky Lady." Originally laid down as HMCS
Iroquois, the ship sustained bomb damage while
under construction resulting in the change ofthe
name. Once operational the ship was plagued ~with
mishap. It was involved in two minor collisions,
then hit by a glider bomb in the Bay of Biscay in
August 1943. Finally, Athabaskan was sunk by
friendly forces as a result of misidentification.
Official credit for the sinking has gone to T-24.
This oversight should be corrected.
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